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Abstract
Research programs in quantitative behavior genetics and evolutionary psychology have
contributed to the widespread belief that some psychological characteristics can be
“inherited” via genetic mechanisms. In fact, molecular and developmental biologists have
concluded that while genetic factors contribute to the development of all of our traits,
non-genetic factors always do too, and in ways that make them no less important than
genetic factors. This insight demands a reworking of the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis,
a theory that defined evolution as a process involving changes in the frequencies of genes
in populations, and that envisioned no role for experiential factors now known to play
essential roles in adaptive trait development. Furthermore, since evolution has been taken
to be strictly a population-level phenomenon while development affects individuals, the
two have been understood to require different levels of analysis; this understanding has
given rise to incompatible research programs. This state of affairs is untenable because
development and evolution mutually influence one another in fundamental ways, several
of which are detailed in this article. The balance of this paper considers the conceptual
problem that has arisen because understandings generated by developmental scientists
cannot be enhanced by studies designed merely to account for variation across
populations. Because the theoretical conceptions and methodological tools used to study
development and evolution have produced non-corresponding sets of information about
these closely related and mutually influential biological processes, these conceptions and
tools are interfering with the establishment of a unified theory of biology that
encompasses both phenomena.
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Individuals and populations: How biology’s theory and data have interfered
with the integration of development and evolution
The phrase “new ideas in psychology” can refer either to influential ideas that
have emerged in the writings of psychologists or to ideas that have emerged in allied
fields and that are now influencing thinking among psychologists. Such bidirectional
influence has been easy to observe recently at the interface of evolutionary biology and
psychology.1 Among the ideas currently sweeping through psychology is the idea that
many human psychological characteristics can be understood when subjected to
evolutionary analysis. The collection of scientists who call themselves “evolutionary
psychologists”—including such theorists as Leda Cosmides, John Tooby, Steven Pinker,
David Buss, Martin Daly, Margo Wilson, and Donald Symons—have attempted to
explain cognitive phenomena by first inferring what sorts of problems our huntergatherer ancestors in the Pleistocene epoch might have needed to solve in order to survive
and reproduce, and then determining how natural selection operating on such a
population might have led to the mental structures that characterize modern people. As a
result of this work, the psychological literature has grown full of references to putative
evolved psychological characteristics such as an innate “mental organ” that creates
grammatical sentences (Chomsky, 1975), a domain-specific cognitive module dedicated
to detecting individuals who are cheating in social exchanges (Cosmides, 1989), and a
modular “theory-of-mind mechanism” that uses a social partner’s behaviors to infer her
mental states (Baron-Cohen, 1995).
Meanwhile, molecular biologists, developmental biologists, and neuroscientists
have discovered that biological characteristics always develop as a result of complex

Individuals and Populations 4
interactions between genetic and non-genetic factors. Given that our psychological
characteristics reflect the structure and function of the biological organ in our heads,
psychological characteristics, too, always reflect the interaction of genetic and
environmental factors. Although the new ideas emerging in these diverse camps have
made this a very exciting time to be a psychological scientist, aspects of these ideas have
illuminated existing problems in our long-established theory of evolution that have yet to
be solved. To understand the source of these problems, some knowledge about the
historical origins of our current theory of evolution—and the role of development in that
theory—will be helpful.
A brief history of ideas about the relationship between development and evolution
The idea that evolution and development are integrally related is very old (see
Gould (1977) for a thorough discussion of this idea in antiquity), but for the present
purposes, it is enough to note the presence of this idea in 1859, at the inception of modern
evolutionary theory, when Darwin published The Origin of Species. Darwin—building on
the speculations in 1794 of his grandfather, Erasmus Darwin—devoted sections of both
The Origin of Species and The Descent of Man to embryological considerations, noting in
the latter that his case for common descent of all mammals was strengthened significantly
by the observation that “the embryo of man closely resembles that of other mammals” (p.
182). Just 7 years later, Ernst Haeckel concluded that “ontogeny [i.e., the development of
an organism over its lifetime] is the short and rapid recapitulation of phylogeny [i.e., the
evolution of a species across generations]. ...During its own rapid development...an
individual repeats the most important changes in form evolved by its ancestors during their
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long and slow paleontological development” (1866 vol.2, p. 300, cited in Gould, 1977, p.
76-77).
Although it turned out that Haeckel’s conclusion was wrong, many biologists
have continued to believe that our understandings of development and evolution can and
should inform one another. For example, Walter Garstang wrote in 1922 that “through
the whole course of Evolution, every adult…has been the climax of a…life-cycle, which
has always intervened between adult and adult…[Evolution] has never been a direct
succession of adult forms, but a succession of ontogenies” (p. 82). Exploring the
relationship between development and evolution from this perspective led Garstang to
suggest that evolutionarily adaptive traits first arise when developmental events lead
descendant generations to have altered versions of characteristics that were present in
their ancestors. He concluded “Ontogeny does not recapitulate Phylogeny: it creates it”
(p. 98).
In the third edition of his 1930 book Embryos and evolution (renamed Embryos
and ancestors in 1958), Gavin de Beer elaborated on this idea by co-opting one of
Haeckel’s terms—heterochrony—to explain how alterations across generations in the
timing of the development of particular characteristics could be an important
evolutionary force. Noting that changes in the timing of developmental events could lead
to novel characteristics, de Beer pointed out that via such a mechanism, developmental
events could potentially drive evolution. For example, if characteristics that are present in
ancestors only when they are juveniles begin to be retained into adulthood in descendant
generations—perhaps through a slowing down of the development of those
characteristics, a process known as neoteny—natural selection would be able to
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‘evaluate’ the adaptive quality of those characteristics in the adults, and potentially
permit them to appear in subsequent generations of adult descendants.
In fact, such a phenomenon appears to have been important in the evolution of
human beings; Gottlieb (1992) discussed one example of a neotenous characteristic that
was present in our ancestors when they were juveniles, but that now characterizes adult
humans:
“An example of neoteny in our own species…is our retention into
adulthood of the cranial flexure of the fetal period (eyes and nose facing at
right angle to spine). This embryonic condition is exhibited by all other
mammals, which then deviate [during development] such that the eyes and
nose form a more or less continuous line with the angle of the spinal cord
in the adult form. The retention of this embryonic feature in [adult]
humans is accompanied by others, such as the retention of the fetal skull
shape and nonopposable big toe, all of which are necessary to, or are
correlated with, upright walking posture” (p. 100).
The arguments that de Beer advanced about the importance of developmental events to
evolutionary processes continue to enjoy support among contemporary biologists
(Buckley, Alcobendas, García-París, & Wake, 2007; Gould, 2002; McNamara &
McKinney, 2005).
In the late 1930’s, a group of biologists, including such luminaries as Ernst Mayr,
Julian Huxley, and Theodosius Dobzhansky, began trying to synthesize Darwin’s theory
of evolution-by-natural-selection with the theory of the gene that had emerged from the
work of Gregor Mendel, August Weismann, Wilhelm Johannsen, and Thomas Hunt
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Morgan. Their achievement, known today as “The Modern Synthesis,” continues to be
accepted by virtually all contemporary biologists as the theory of evolution. However, in
spite of how astonishingly successful the Modern Synthesis has been in its ability to
make sense of the disparate data emerging from the fields of molecular biology, genetics,
biochemistry, and cell biology, one major omission in the theory continues to be
problematic: the theory gives virtually no role to development, in spite of how important
developmental processes obviously are to all biological phenomena. As Moore noted in
2001, “the exclusion of developmental data from the modern synthesis continues to
interfere with efforts to forge a comprehensive theory of evolution” (p. 167).
Some of the architects of the modern synthesis—including Dobzhansky, Huxley
and Sewall Wright, for example—were aware of the importance of development, but they
also knew that a working understanding of many developmental problems (e.g., cell
differentiation, among others) was still well beyond the grasp of biology. Nevertheless,
the biologists who contributed to the modern synthesis—if they were concerned about the
problem of development at all—recognized that by temporarily ignoring developmental
issues, they would be able to produce an almost-comprehensive theory of biology that
would have extraordinary explanatory power. Consequently, they made the decision to
define evolution as a process involving changes in the frequencies of genes in
populations, a move that allowed them to disregard the developmental processes that
operate on individuals, while still producing a theory on the genetics of evolution.
Biologists have operated successfully under this theory for over 6 decades, but
recent insights from molecular biology, developmental biology, and the neurosciences are
forcing reconsideration of several fundamental issues, including how development should
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be integrated into the modern theory of evolution (Gottlieb, 1992; Lickliter & Honeycutt,
2003); whether or not biologists’ traditional conceptualization of heredity is up to the
tasks currently assigned to it (Griffiths & Gray, 2001); and what data from studies of
population genetics can tell us about the appearance of characteristics in individual
development. The current paper will focus on this final issue. Psychological phenomena,
in particular, can illuminate some of the problems that must be solved before a
comprehensive theory of evolution can be articulated.
How recent discoveries in molecular and developmental biology
laboratories have highlighted problems in The Modern Synthesis
The past 10 years have seen an explosion of new information about the workings
of the human genome (Guttmacher & Collins, 2005). Even as approximately 3 billion
dollars were spent in the Human Genome Project’s effort to map our DNA, the frontiers
of research expanded to include work on proteomics—research on the full complement of
proteins present in given cells, tissues, or organisms—and epigenomics—research on
how “non-genetic” features of DNA and its immediate environment (e.g., methylation
patterns and histone modifications) determine how genes actually function in normally
developing organisms (Brena, Huang, & Plass, 2006). Among the conclusions that can be
drawn from this work is that it is a misleading simplification to maintain that genetic
factors can cause developmental outcomes independently of the contexts in which the
genes of interest are operating2 (Eisenberg, 2004; Meaney, 2007; Robert, 2006). In fact,
DNA is unable to make any contributions to development without the help of non-genetic
factors present in its local environment (Dennett, 1995; Keller, 2000; Oyama, 1992), so
development is best thought of as resulting from a collaboration between all of these
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factors (Griffiths & Gray, 1994). Such an understanding emphasizes the fact that
development is an epigenetic process. Among the best examples of DNA’s dependence
on its context is the phenomenon of alternative splicing, wherein a single genetic
sequence can serve different functions depending on the particular cell in which it is
being ‘decoded;’ although such alternative splicing was once thought to be a relatively
rare phenomenon, it is now believed to characterize more than 30 percent of the genedecoding operations that occur during normal development (Neumann-Held, 1998).
If only the non-genetic factors that contribute to development were all themselves
constructed through the actions of genes, one might still hope to retain the notion that
‘gene complexes’ are able to function autonomously, but recent research on gene
expression indicates that the environment outside of our bodies—what psychologists
typically think of as ‘nurture’—plays essential roles in this process (Gottlieb, 2004;
Harper, 2005; Meaney & Szyf, 2005; Weaver et al., 2007). For instance, it has been
known for at least two decades that specific experiences can alter the release of hormones
into our bloodstreams, and that some of these hormones—including, but not limited to,
cortisone, the estrogens, and testosterone—can then diffuse into cell nuclei and bind with
hormone receptors to form a steroid/receptor complex which itself can bind with DNA,
and thereby regulate the rate at which genes produce their protein products (Yamamoto,
1985). With the discovery of a number of such mechanisms of gene regulation, several
theorists have begun to think of the genome as fundamentally reactive (Gilbert, 2003), in
recognition of the fact that it is highly responsive to features of the environment.
Paradoxically, then, one of the most important insights to emerge from focused
study of how genetic factors contribute to development is the realization that non-genetic
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factors are just as important as genes in producing developmental outcomes, no matter
what outcome is being considered. The dissemination of this conclusion has been
hindered by widely reported findings from studies by quantitative behavior geneticists
(e.g., Deater-Deckard, Petrill, Thompson, & DeThorne, 2006; Wainwright, Wright,
Geffen, Luciano, & Martin, 2005) and from studies by evolutionary psychologists (e.g.,
Bernard, Mills, Swenson, & Walsh, 2005; De Cruz, 2006; Hampson, van Anders, &
Mullin, 2006), all of which have supported the (largely foregone) conclusion that our
characteristics are influenced by genetic factors. Nonetheless, while it is not always
made clear in their writings (e.g., Deater-Deckard et al., 2006; Yamagata et al., 2006),
leading quantitative behavior geneticists have acknowledged that their research does not
assess the relative importance of genetic and non-genetic contributions to individual
development (Plomin, 1994), and leading evolutionary psychologists have acknowledged
that no “sane biologist would ever dream of proposing” that human behavior is
genetically determined (Pinker, 2002, p. 112). Thus, although genetic factors obviously
contribute to the development of all human characteristics, it is now widely understood
among biologists that the presence of particular genes in a body is not enough to singlehandedly cause the development of either psychological or biological traits (biologists’
vernacular use of the linguistic shorthand, “the gene for _______,” notwithstanding).
One of the consequences of this emerging understanding of gene function is that
our received theory of evolution—The Modern Synthesis—cannot be understood to be a
comprehensive theory of evolution. According to the Modern Synthesis, evolution occurs
when random genetic mutations generate novel characteristics—phenotypes—that can be
selected by nature if they are adaptive, and thereby become more prevalent in descendent

Individuals and Populations 11
populations than they were in ancestral populations. This conceptualization works well as
long as the only source of novel phenotypes is genetic, a belief that received important
support from the strong arguments of biologist August Weismann at the end of the 19th
century (Barker, 1993), and that was effectively enshrined by Francis Crick six decades
later as biology’s “Central Dogma” (1958, 1970). However, because we now know that
novel phenotypes are constructed via the co-action of both genetic and non-genetic
factors—an arrangement that precludes the possibility that either type of factor might be
more important to the process than the other (Robert, 2006)—the Modern Synthesis will
have to be reworked.
Modifying the Modern Synthesis to reflect the importance of behavior
The discovery that all phenotypes are built during development in an epigenetic
process involving the co-action of genetic and non-genetic factors (Gottlieb, 1992) means
that animals’ behaviors can have potentially important roles in evolutionary processes, a
possibility not acknowledged in the canonical account of evolution. For example, if the
behaviors of a population of animals lead them into novel environments, novel processes
could influence the development of their offspring, potentially producing adaptive
characteristics, either directly or indirectly. Because subsequent generations produced by
the offspring of these pioneering animals would be raised in the same environments as
their parents were, and would therefore experience substantially the same developmental
processes, these descendants would likewise develop the adaptive characteristics that
contributed to their ancestors’ survival.
The potential importance of such a sequence of events, which Gilbert Gottlieb
(1987; Johnston & Gottlieb, 1990) first identified and then named behavioral
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neophenogenesis, can be illustrated by considering the recent discovery that genes
associated with the ability to digest milk in adulthood seem to have evolved
independently in European and African populations. This finding appears to reflect
convergent evolution attributable “to a strong selective force, adult milk consumption”
(Tishkoff et al., 2007, p. 37 – 38). Following the discovery 4 decades ago that adult
human populations vary significantly in their ability to digest milk (Cuatrecasas,
Lockwood, & Caldwell, 1965), scores of studies examined the geographical distributions
of these populations; taken together, the studies revealed that the ability to digest dairy
products—i.e., to absorb lactose, the sugar present in mammalian milks—is most
common “in northern European populations (>90% in Swedes and Danes), decreases in
frequency across southern Europe and the Middle East (~50% in Spanish, French, and
pastoralist [i.e., herding] Arab populations) and is low in non-pastoralist Asian and
African populations (~1% in Chinese [populations])” (Tishkoff et al., p. 31). Importantly,
the ancestors of the lactose-absorbing northern Europeans were dairying peoples,
whereas the ancestors of the lactose-malabsorbing East Asians, for instance, were not.
After testing several hypotheses that could account for the observed pattern of data,
Durham (1991) concluded that “the genes responsible for adult lactose absorption have
evolved to high frequencies in populations that (1) have a long-standing tradition of
dairying and fresh milk consumption, and (2) live in environments of low ultraviolet
radiation where vitamin D and metabolic calcium are chronically deficient” (p. 279).
Because both of these conditions characterize populations able to digest milk, Durham
concluded that the data point to “the role of culture in the evolution of adult lactose
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absorption” (p. 280) and that “dairying and the genes of adult lactose absorption
coevolved” (p. 282). Similarly, Tishkoff et al. (2007) wrote:
Considering the symptoms of lactose intolerance, which includes water
loss from diarrhea, individuals who … could tolerate milk could have had
a very strong selective advantage. Because the selective force, adult milk
consumption, is associated with the cultural development of cattle
domestication, the recent and rapid spread of [genes associated with the
ability to digest milk in adulthood], together with the practice of
pastoralism [in those East African populations recently found able to
absorb lactose], is an excellent example of ongoing adaptation in humans
and coevolution of genes and culture” (p. 36)
Although some theorists have recognized for decades that a population’s behavior
(i.e., culture) can potentially have direct influences on biological evolution (see, for
example, several contributed papers in Montagu, 1962), empirical evidence of such
phenomena has now begun to appear (McComb & Semple, 2005; Tishkoff et al., 2007).
In addition, a substantial literature now exists that describes computational models that
support the likelihood that cultural processes such as female infanticide and sex-biased
abortions have evolutionary consequences (Laland, Kumm, & Feldman, 1995) and that
human handedness reflects gene-culture coevolution (Laland, Kumm, Van Horn, &
Feldman, 1995). These results underscore the need to further integrate development into
our theory of evolution, a theory that has focused for 7 decades on the role of genetic
factors alone, while excluding roles for the experiences that normally influence individual
development.
Populations vs. individuals: Historical approaches to evolution and development
These signs that development is beginning to be reintegrated into evolutionary
theory represent a welcome step forward, but such reintegration will ultimately reveal an
intractable problem that reflects the history of our current ideas about the two
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phenomena. Although development and evolution share an important relationship, they
have historically been understood to require different levels of analysis; the history of
thought about these phenomena has left us with a large conceptual stumbling block that
to date has prevented us from achieving a comprehensive understanding of their
relationship.
At least since 1894—when Wilhelm Roux founded a journal specifically to
publish the work of experimental embryologists—the study of development has focused on
the mechanical causes of ontogeny in individual organisms. In contrast, scholars of
evolution have always explained phylogeny by studying variability in populations; this
approach can be traced initially to Charles Darwin, who strongly emphasized the
importance of variability in the Origin of Species.
Although Darwin is often erroneously remembered by non-biologists as the man
who introduced the idea of evolution to the world, his major contribution according to
most evolutionary biology textbooks is “population thinking” (Ariew, in press). Prior to
Darwin, most naturalists considered the variations detectable among a group of
individuals to be “errors,” that is, departures from an essential Aristotelian type (eidos)
that were caused by diverse forces keeping the varying individuals from their “natural”
state (Sober, 1994). In contrast, Darwin understood that the variation seen among
individual members of a species played an important role in the natural process that gives
rise to species. Consequently, evolutionary biology has been characterized by “population
thinking” ever since. Mayr, in particular, extolled the virtues of this point of view in his
1959 essay “Typological versus Population Thinking.” Building on this perspective—and
on the work of very early geneticists such as Gregor Mendel and T.H. Morgan—a group
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of biologists including R.A. Fisher and J. B. S. Haldane established the field of
population genetics, a discipline founded as the study of the causes of individual
differences, not the causes of individual organisms’ characteristics.
Quantitative behavior genetics—the branch of population genetics devoted to
exploring genetic contributions to behaviors—attempts to account for phenotypic
variation in a population by finding correlations between the presence of particular
genetic differences and the presence of particular phenotypic differences. Said another
way, the goal of quantitative behavior geneticists is to identify genetic factors that can
account for the individual differences observed in members of a population. One method
such behavior geneticists use to accomplish this is the twin study, the strongest form of
which involves studying monozygotic (MZ, or “identical”) twins who were “separated at
birth,” and comparing their concordance on a given trait with the concordance on the
same trait of separated-at-birth dizygotic (DZ, or “fraternal”) twins. Because MZ twins
share a full complement of identical genes whereas DZ twins share, on average, only half
of their genes, greater concordance among the MZ than the DZ twins in such studies is
taken as evidence for genetic contributions to the trait in question. In the language of
quantitative behavior genetics, variation in genetic factors account for measured variation
in the trait being studied.
Although the goal of this endeavor is to explain individual differences, behavior
geneticists who rely on twin studies never actually study the factors that cause the
development of traits in individuals. Instead, they calculate correlations that reflect the
strength of the relationship between genetic variation in a population, and variation
across that population in a particular phenotype—a developmental outcome.
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Consequently, the results of such studies do not reveal anything about what causes the
traits in question in individuals; this is the interpretation-of-correlations problem that all
undergraduate psychology students learn about in their first statistics classes. Obviously,
it is possible to study the mechanical causes of the development of a trait in a variety of
individuals and thereby learn what exactly causes these individuals to vary from one
another on that characteristic, but in practice, the study of individual psychological or
behavioral differences in human beings has virtually never proceeded in this way.3
Why the differences between population approaches and
developmental approaches are a problem: An overview
While quantitative behavior geneticists have been studying the phenomena of
interest to them, developmentally oriented biologists, psychologists, and psychobiologists
have pursued a program of research designed to reveal the antecedent, mechanical causes
of development in individual organisms, by conducted experiments that entail intervening
in normal development. Thus, the efforts of developmentalists on one hand and
quantitative behavior geneticists on the other have given rise to parallel sets of
information, one about developmental influences on individual organisms and one about
how genetic variation is correlated with phenotypic variation across populations. Both
endeavors have generated large quantities of data, but they represent fundamentally
different approaches to their objects of study, and the gulf in comprehension that has
emerged because understandings in one domain cannot be used to enhance
understandings in the other domain represents a serious conceptual problem.
This problem arises because development and evolution influence one another in
fundamental ways; they are interconnected in ways that are apparent even before one
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considers the nature of their interactions in detail. Developmental processes produce all
of the characteristics that natural selection—an evolutionary process—operates on; the
characteristics that are “visible” to natural selection are phenotypic characteristics that are
always realized in development.4 Likewise, by selecting adaptive characteristics in one
generation, nature—that is, the evolutionary process of natural selection—indirectly
influences how those characteristics develop in later generations. Thus, development and
evolution could hardly share a closer relationship.
If the processes of development and evolution were not so intertwined, perhaps it
would not be a problem that developmentalists and population/behavior geneticists have
historically studied different phenomena. After all, there are many other scientific
domains in which disparate sets of information have sometimes arisen from different
levels of analysis, and in which such outcomes have not necessarily been bothersome; an
understanding of the fluid dynamics that characterize a stream of water, for instance, can
generally be achieved without considering the motion that characterizes the behavior of
individual water molecules in the stream (i.e., the activity that gives rise to Brownian
motion). The existence of such scientific domains has emboldened quantitative behavior
geneticists to claim that it is reasonable for them to study variation across populations at
one level of analysis while developmentalists study the emergence of phenotypic
characteristics at a different level of analysis (Bouchard & Segal, 1985); Mitchell (2003,
p. 186) and Tabery (2007) have called this a form of “isolationist pluralism” wherein the
two types of researchers simply accept as unproblematic the fact that they are studying
phenomena at different levels of analysis. However, the repercussions of the wildly
different approaches to explanation taken by those interested in the causes of individual
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development and those interested in accounting for variation across populations are
problematic because of the profound influences that evolutionary and developmental
processes have on one another; the fact that we are now in possession of two noncorresponding sets of information about closely related biological processes is worrisome
indeed. To put the problem starkly, a species is a population that is subject to
evolutionary forces, but it is composed of individuals that are subject to developmental
forces; although development and evolution influence one another, the theoretical
conceptions and methodological tools we have used to study them continue to interfere
with the establishment of a unified theory that encompasses both sorts of phenomena.
Because the architects of the Modern Synthesis adopted the heuristic conceits that
development is completely under genetic control and that characteristics that are shaped
even partially by experiences cannot be inherited, they were able to effectively ‘blackbox’ development; under such an arrangement, an evolutionary theory that is strictly a
theory of populations is unproblematic. But, as the last decade has unfolded and the
multi-directional flow of information between the molecular, organismic, and population
levels of analysis has become apparent (R. Lickliter, personal communication, January
24, 2007), this limitation of our current evolutionary theory has become increasingly
unworkable.
Influences across levels of analysis
In the nearly 100 years since T. H. Morgan concluded that Mendel’s and
Johannsen’s “genes” were on nuclear chromosomes, the influence of molecular factors on
the structure and function of organisms has been recognized. In contrast, it is much more
recently that scientists have come to understand that organismic factors also have vitally
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important influences on the genome. Although there is little evidence that events
experienced during normal development can actually change the sequence of nucleotides in
an individual’s genome (but see Steele, Lindley, and Blanden, 1998, for controversial
evidence of such a phenomenon), it is now clear that non-genetic factors influence the
functioning of the genome in a number of ways. For example, non-genetic factors that affect
normal phenotypic development include methylation patterns, hormone exposure, and
sensory stimulation, among others (Harper, 2005; Jablonka & Lamb, 2005). As indicated
above, several of the mechanisms by which these factors regulate gene expression—
effectively turning genes ‘on’ or ‘off’—are now well understood; such mechanisms provide
ways for our experiences to alter our characteristics by altering the functioning of our genes.
Similarly, the discovery of ‘immediate early genes’ has alerted us to the possibility that gene
expression can be influenced directly by factors in the environment. Environmental stimuli
already known to influence genetic functioning include stress (Glaser et al., 1990), light
experienced during the normally-dark phase of circadian cycles (Rusak, Robertson, Wisden,
& Hunt, 1990), and the tactile stimulation that rat pups experience when their mothers
groom them in their first week of postnatal life (Meaney & Szyf, 2005).
Importantly, some of these phenomena produce effects that can be transmitted
across generations, thus providing an avenue by which non-genetic factors experienced
during an individual’s lifetime can have effects on descendant generations. The effects of
specific experiences on genetic functioning will, in certain cases, not appear in descendants
unless the descendants have experiences similar to the ones that produced the effects in the
ancestral generation.5 But in other cases, an experience at some point in an individual
organism’s life can have effects that alter the development of descendant generations, even
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if the descendant generations develop in an environment free of the factor that originally
affected their ancestor.
For example, Champagne & Meaney (2006) have reported that female rats that
ordinarily exhibit high levels of maternal licking and grooming will, after having been
stressed during pregnancy, dramatically reduce their licking and grooming of their newborn
pups, and ultimately wind up with abnormally fearful adult male offspring and with adult
female offspring that themselves are abnormally low on measures of licking and grooming.
Interestingly, the adult grand-pups—the offspring of these abnormal offspring—will
likewise be fearful if they are male, and low licking/grooming mothers if they are female.
But perhaps most striking is the finding that when the original stressed females are mated a
second time so as to give birth to pups that did not experience stress as fetuses, the offspring
will nonetheless show the effects of the mothers’ earlier stressful experiences—presumably
because the mothers continue to exhibit low levels of licking and grooming—and the effect
will likewise continue to be apparent in the behaviors of the grand-pups. Clearly, the
experience of stress during pregnancy can change female rats’ behaviors in a way that can
subsequently be passed from generation to generation, even if later generations never
experience gestational stress themselves. Additional work in the laboratory of Michael
Meaney (e.g., Meaney & Szyf, 2005; Weaver et al., 2007) has demonstrated how maternal
behaviors can permanently influence gene expression in descendant generations by
environmentally ‘programming’ the genome in ways that lead to effects that persist across
generations. Analogous findings from studies of the transgenerational effects of exposure to
environmental toxins have likewise led to the conclusion that environmental factors can
“reprogram the germ line” (Anway, Cupp, Uzumcu, & Skinner, 2005; Crews et al., 2007)6.
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Taken together, it is now clear that factors operating at the level of the genes and factors
operating at the level of the organism mutually influence one another, and that factors
operating at both levels influence the development and maintenance of behavioral
phenotypes.
The same symmetrical relations characterize influences at the level of the organism
and at the level of the population of which the organism is a part. Clearly, the behaviors of
particular animals can have population-level effects, effects that can influence evolution. If a
mutation in a small group of individuals within a population gives them a reproductive
advantage over their conspecifics, then all other things being equal, the descendant
populations will, on average, be more like the mutated ancestors than the non-mutated
ancestors. But even without any mutations, if a small group of individuals within a
population begins to behave in a novel, adaptive way—perhaps as a reaction to other
animals migrating into their traditional environments, or as a reaction to large scale
meteorological events like global warming—similar consequences could ensue.
For instance, Michel and Moore (1995) have described how some troops of landdwelling Japanese monkeys living near the ocean began to receive food from human
tourists, after which they started washing the food in the sea, a novel behavior for this
species. Ultimately, this behavior led to an increase in the quantity and types of seafood they
consumed, and led to more swimming and diving than had previously been observed. If
such behaviors prove beneficial to these innovators, it is easy to imagine other members of
the population ultimately behaving similarly—monkeys being known for their tendency to
imitate, after all—leading to the novel behavior characterizing the entire population.
Importantly, Michel and Moore go on to point out the potential evolutionary consequences
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of such novel behaviors: these monkeys could begin to subsist on seafood alone if the
tourists stop feeding them one day, and once they begin to exploit this novel niche, the
possibility of “extending their range by swimming to nearby islands” (p. 161) suddenly
emerges, an event that would entail clear evolutionary implications, given how reproductive
isolation influences evolution.
Likewise, behaviors and habitats that characterize populations of animals have very
important influences on the development of individual organisms. As Lickliter and Berry
(1990) have pointed out, the species-typical environments in which mature animals raise
their offspring—that is, the habitats characteristically occupied by those populations—are
structured in ways that positively contribute to phenotypic outcomes; perceptual arrays
experienced by all normal juveniles of a species can have important effects on the
development of those individuals’ perceptual competencies. Similarly, modes of
communication can be thought of as phenotypic features of populations, features that are
present in species-typical environments and that profoundly influence the characteristics of
individuals developing in those contexts. Of course, the traits of the individuals subjected to
these developmental influences have evolutionary consequences in turn, since these are
traits that natural selection can then operate on; it is, after all, natural selection operating on
individuals that gives rise to changes in frequencies of genes in populations.
Thus, events occurring at the level of the genome affect the development of the
individual organism, and events experienced by the organism affect the functioning of the
genome; likewise, events occurring at the level of the organism affect the characteristics of
the population, and characteristics of populations affect the development of individual
organisms. These dual bidirectional flows of information seem consonant with the intuition
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of virtually all biologists who wrote in the 50 years following the publication of Darwin’s
Origin of Species; there is a close and important relationship between individual
development and evolution. But since the formulation of the Modern Synthesis 70 years
ago, developmental phenomena have been seen as being under strict genetic control—
subject to information flowing unidirectionally, from the genome to the organism—and
evolution has been restrictively defined as a population-level phenomenon only.
The history of ideas about development and evolution has
left us with widespread conceptual confusion
As a result of the structure and assumptions of the Modern Synthesis, it is possible to
read about studies using the techniques of population genetics in almost any current journal
of psychology or biology; but even though such techniques measure variability across
populations, they provide no understanding at all of the mechanical causes of the individual
development that must be responsible for that variability. To choose just one representative
example from a journal of psychological science, Deater-Deckard et al. (2006) recently
issued a report of a longitudinal behavioral genetic analysis of task persistence in nearly 200
pairs of twins tested first in Kindergarten or 1st grade, and then re-tested 1 year later. The
authors wrote in their introduction “knowing whether and how the genetic … and …
environmental influences on task persistence contribute to stability and change yields more
precise predictions about how specific genes and environments operate in development” (p.
499). However, twin studies are not able to illuminate anything about how genes and
environments operate in development, because such studies are designed to account for
variability across populations, not to explore the genetic and non-genetic factors that
mechanically cause development in individuals (Moore, 2006).
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Reporting on their results, Deater-Deckard et al. (2006) wrote that they had detected
stability in individual differences in task persistence that were “accounted for predominantly
by stable genetic influences” (p. 502), and they concluded that “genetic variation appears to
be very important” when trying to explain this stability. To their credit, these researchers
were careful to point out that their data do “not allow us to infer a causal direction of
influence, given that these data are correlational” (p. 503). Nonetheless, although their final
paragraph again acknowledges that “causality cannot be inferred from quasi-experimental
behavioral genetic designs,” the words immediately preceding this caveat assert “that the
causes of…stability shift with development—from shared environmental influences in early
childhood to genetic influences in middle childhood” (p. 503), as if the study they conducted
actually does tell us something about the causes of developmental stability. Because all
quantitative behavioral genetic designs are quasi-experimental—meaning that causality
cannot be inferred from any such design—the confusion introduced and propagated by such
studies, many of which make inappropriate causal claims like Deater-Deckard et al.’s,
remains no small problem.
Finding our way out of this predicament will not be easy. The first step might very
well entail acknowledgement by both biologists and psychologists that the data of molecular
and developmental biology do not permit the existence of genes ‘for’ full-blown phenotypic
traits (Jablonka & Lamb, 2005; Lickliter & Honeycutt, 2003; Moore, 2001; Robert, 2006).
This should be easier for psychologists, because it is obvious that non-genetic factors
contribute to the development of characteristics that are even minimally complex, and all
psychological characteristics rise to this level of complexity. Because the phenotypes that
biologists study can sometimes be as simple as the presence or absence of a protein in an
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organism’s body, it would seem that it might be more difficult for them to abandon the idea
of genes ‘for’ characteristics; but because the shape of a protein molecule—often considered
to be the direct product of genetic activity—is influenced by non-genetic factors such as the
temperature and pH in the intracellular environment in which the protein is built (Johnston,
1987), even simple proteins cannot be thought of as existing in an organism prior to the
realization of the developmental processes needed to construct them. Fortunately, more and
more biologists seem to understand this point.
Once we recognize the importance of developmental events in the construction of
the phenotypes that natural selection can operate on, we will be in a position to begin
elaborating a theory of evolution able to explain biological and psychological phenomena
in a unified way. This will be the first step in a long reconceptualization process, though,
because one of the bedrock notions in our current theory of evolution is Weismann’s
doctrine that developmental events cannot play a role in evolution. As soon as this error
is acknowledged, however, the definition of evolution as a process entailing only changes
in the frequency of genes in populations will need to be changed.
The definition of evolution that emerges from this shake up will likely shift
scientists’ focus from genotypes to phenotypes, and will require an expanded view of
how phenotypes are transmitted from generation to generation. Rather than maintaining
that genetic material alone is inherited by descendant generations, the emerging theory
will have room for the idea that species-typical environments are effectively inherited by
descendant generations as well (albeit through a very different mechanism); Griffiths and
Gray have explicated this idea in several publications (1994, 2001). And once this idea is
in place, the belief that natural selection operates on genes alone will give way to the
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belief that natural selection operates on gene-environment complexes, structures that give
rise—in development—to adaptive phenotypes. Gottlieb first referred to such complexes
as developmental manifolds in 1971.
These new ideas will not come to characterize entire fields of study quickly;
psychologists—and biologists, to a somewhat lesser extent (as ironic as that might
seem)—remain enthralled by the idea that evolutionary processes have provided us with
genomes that dictate the development of characteristics that were adaptive for our
evolutionary ancestors living in Africa in the Pleistocene epoch (e.g., Faulkner, Schaller,
Park, & Duncan, 2004). But change will come as the data of molecular and
developmental biology continue to undermine the foundations of our current theory of
evolution by calling into question the assumption that genetic factors can determine the
appearances of our characteristics (Kuhn, 1996). There is obviously much work to be
done in the interim, but these new ideas hold out the possibility of forging a theory of
evolution that is consistent with the known facts of development. Such a theory would
encourage an understanding of population-level phenomena that can actually inform, and
be informed by, our understandings of organism-level phenomena.
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Footnotes
1

Gilbert Gottlieb, to whom this paper is dedicated, was instrumental in helping

many in the current generation of developmental psychologists to think about the
connections between their work and the work of evolutionary biologists.
2

There have always been biologists who understood how important context is for

gene activity. For example, Wilhem Johannsen, the man who actually coined the word
“gene” in 1909, clearly understood that traits are not caused by genes operating
independently of developmental “conditions.” Likewise, it is apparent from their writings
that Lancelot Hogben (1945) and Conrad Waddington (1957) were both keenly aware that
developmental outcomes (phenotypes) are always influenced by contextual factors.
3

Note that such a strategy would permit the integration of approaches that Tabery

(2007) has called for, because it could generate information that would explain both the
appearance of characteristics in individuals and differences in those characteristics across
members of a population. Nonetheless, this strategy will not eliminate the central
problem I am outlining in this paper, for at least two reasons. First, adopting this strategy
would still leave the extant literature of quantitative behavior genetics explanatorily
isolated from literatures on the mechanical causes of development; just because it is
possible to identify developmental factors that contribute to differences in phenotypes
does not mean that quantitative behavior geneticists—who for the past century have used
correlational approaches to account for variation across populations—have done any such
thing. As has always been the case, correlations tell us remarkably little about causation.
Second, as long as 1) evolution is defined as a change in the frequency of certain genes in
a population (i.e., that evolution is strictly a population-level phenomenon) and 2) the
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scientific community persists in accepting as axiomatic the idea that developmental
events can influence some of our characteristics but that such so-called “acquired”
characteristics cannot influence evolution, an untenable conceptual barrier between
developmental and evolutionary phenomena will exist, and will continue to interfere with
the construction of a unified theory of biology.
4

Genotypic differences between individuals that do not give rise to phenotypic

differences cannot possibly be subjected to differential selective pressures, and so cannot
drive evolution in an active way. Different phenotypes, in contrast, can be subjected to
differential selective pressures, but the phenotypes in question always result from
developmental processes in which genetic and non-genetic factors collaborate to
construct the potentially selectable characteristics.
5

While such an effect would generally be considered unable to contribute to

evolution, some theorists have argued that because all characteristics develop via
coaction of both genetic and non-genetic factors, there is no principled way to distinguish
between traits that are “inheritable” (and therefore relevant to evolutionary explanation)
and traits that are “acquired” during development (and are therefore not relevant to
evolutionary explanation). Arguments consistent with this point of view can be found in
Griffiths & Gray (2001) and Moore (2001).
6

Although the sorts of effects described by Anway et al. (2005) and Crews et al.

(2007) would be considered heretical by many biologists steeped in traditional accounts
of evolution, Jablonka & Lamb’s (2005) survey of non-genetic systems of information
inheritance suggests that biologists can expect to find such effects in their data once they
begin to look for them in earnest.

